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We establish mathematical equivalence between independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives and monotonicity with respect to ￿rst order stochastic dominance. This
formal equivalence result between the two principles is obtained under two key con-
ditions. Firstly, for all m 2 N, each principle is de￿ned on the domain of compound
lotteries with compoundness level m. Secondly, the standard concept of reduction
of compound lotteries applies.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D81.
￿I thank J￿rgen Eichberger, Martin Hellwig, Ullrich Schmidt, Uzi Segal and two anonymous referees
for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support by ERSA (Economic Research South Africa)
is gratefully acknowledged.
yDepartment of Economics and Econometrics, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, Auckland
Park, 2006, South Africa. E-mail: zimper@bigfoot.com
11 Introduction
In the theory of decision making under risk independence of irrelevant alternatives serves
as key assumption for deriving von Neumann and Morgenstern￿ s (1947) representation
of preferences over lotteries by an expected utility functional (cf. Fishburn 1988). How-
ever, since many real-life decision makers persistently violate independence of irrelevant
alternatives (e.g., Allais 1979), alternative models of decision making under risk (for sur-
veys on this vast literature see, e.g., Schmidt 2004; Starmer 2000; Sugden 2004) typically
weaken the independence assumption while they additionally impose monotonicity with
respect to ￿rst order stochastic dominance. Whereas the normative appeal of indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives is controversially discussed in the literature, researchers
commonly agree upon that monotonicity with respect to ￿rst order stochastic dominance
must be obeyed by rational decision makers. As our main ￿nding we establish mathe-
matical equivalence of these two - seemingly di⁄erent - principles under two conditions.
As a ￿rst condition we assume that each principle is de￿ned, for all m 2 N, on the
domain of compound lotteries with compoundness level m. As a second condition we
assume that the standard principle of reduction of compound lotteries applies without
restriction. Referring to the development of descriptive decision theories as a reaction
to the Allais paradoxes, Duncan Luce (2000) writes:
￿Some theorists [:::] have to a degree abandoned independence, but have
continued to devise theories on the assumption that the lotteries are well
modeled as random variables, and so they accept the (automatic) reduction
of compound gambles. Others of us have interpreted the body of evidence
as favoring consequence monotonicity and as making dubious at a descrip-
tive level the probability reduction principle built into the random variable
notation [:::].￿(p. 47)
This note￿ s equivalence result once more emphasizes that the reduction principle for
compound lotteries is not merely an innocuous assumption but rather plays an important
(and typically hidden) role in the normative interpretation of decision theoretic axioms.
2 Notation and preliminaries





(￿1;s1;:::;￿n;sn) j ￿1;:::;￿n 2 R+;
n X
i=1
￿i = 1 and 9j 2 f1;:::;ng s.t. sj 2 L
m￿1
)
.We interpret the elements of Lm as compound lotteries of level m, that is, there is at
least one compound lottery of level m ￿ 1 in the support of a compound lottery in Lm.
According to this interpretation, the set L =
S
m2N Lm collects all compound lotteries
without any upper bound for their compoundness level m. As standard notational
conventions we introduce order-irrelevance of entries, i.e.,
(::;￿;s;:::;￿;t;::) = (::;￿;t;:::;￿;s;::)
and distribution of weights for identical entries, i.e.,
(::;￿;s;:::;￿;s;::) = (::;(￿ + ￿);s;::).
De￿nition. The preference relation ￿ on L satis￿es complete ordering if and only
if the following three assumptions are ful￿lled:
(i) There exists an asymmetric, non-re￿exive, and transitive binary relation ￿ over
compound lotteries in L.
(ii) s ￿ t if and only if not s ￿ t and not t ￿ s.
(iii) s ￿ t if and only if s ￿ t or s ￿ t.
De￿nition. The preference relation ￿ on L satis￿es reduction of compound lotteries
if and only if, for all m 2 N, the following two assumptions are ful￿lled (where ￿k￿k








(ii) If (1;s) 2 Lm+1 and s 2 Lm then (1;s) ￿ s.
3 Result
Consider a compound lottery
s = (￿1;s1;:::;￿n;sn) 2 L
m+1
such that sk+1 ￿ sk for all k 2 f1;:::;n ￿ 1g. The cumulative distribution function of s
with respect to ￿, F [s] : Lm ! [0;1], is de￿ned asF [s](x) = 0 for all x 2 L





￿j for all x 2 L
m such that sk+1 ￿ x ￿ sk,
F [s](x) = 1 for all x 2 L
m such that x ￿ sn.
We say s strictly dominates t with respect to ￿rst-order stochastic dominance, de-
noted s ￿F t, if and only if F [s](x) ￿ F [t](x) for all x 2 Lm, and F [s](x) < F [t](x)
for some x 2 Lm. Analogously, s ￿F t if and only if F [s](x) = F [t](x) for all x 2 Lm.
De￿nition. The preference relation ￿ on L satis￿es monotonicity with respect to
￿rst-order stochastic dominance with support on Lm if and only if, for all s;t 2 Lm+1,
s ￿F t implies s ￿ t, and s ￿F t implies s ￿ t.
De￿nition. The preference relation ￿ on L satis￿es independence of irrelevant
alternatives with support on Lm if and only if, for all compound lotteries s;t;r 2 Lm,
s ￿ t ) (￿;s;(1 ￿ ￿);r) ￿ (￿;t;(1 ￿ ￿);r)
s ￿ t ) (￿;s;(1 ￿ ￿);r) ￿ (￿;t;(1 ￿ ￿);r)
Proposition. Suppose that the preference relation ￿ on L satis￿es complete ordering
and reduction of compound lotteries. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) For all m 2 N, ￿ satis￿es independence of irrelevant alternatives with support
on Lm.
(ii) For all m 2 N, ￿ satis￿es monotonicity with respect to ￿rst order stochastic
dominance with support on Lm.
4 Proof
At ￿rst we introduce an alternative dominance relation, denoted ￿E, for compound
lotteries and prove - by a lemma - equivalence between ￿E and ￿F.De￿nition. For two compound lotteries s;t 2 Lm+1 such that
s = (￿1;s1;￿2;s2;:::;￿n;sn)
t = (￿1;t1;￿2;t2;:::;￿n;tn)
we write s ￿E t if and only if sk ￿ tk for all k 2 f1;:::;ng. Furthermore, s ￿E t, if
and only if sk ￿ tk for all k 2 f1;:::;ng.
Remark. Observe that the dominance relation ￿E is equivalent to so-called conse-
quence monotonicity (De￿nition 2.3.1. in Luce 2000) whenever transitivity holds and the
decision maker￿ s uncertainty about the occurrence of events is resolved by an additive
probability measure.






















































Proof of the Lemma
Step 1: For any given compound lotteries (1a) and (1b) we construct two compound
lotteries (2a) and (2b) such that equations (3a) and (3b) are satis￿ed. Note that, by the
notational convention order-irrelevance of entries, we can - without loss of generality -
assume that sj+1 ￿ sj and tj+1 ￿ tj, for j 2 f1;:::;n ￿ 1g.1st iteration step. Without loss of generality suppose ￿1 ￿ ￿1 and observe that there
exists a unique number i1 such that
i1 X
k=1






































and observe that the ￿rst i1 + 1 probability weights in s1and in t1 are identical.
2nd iteration step. Focus now on the lotteries s1;t1 and start with the (i1 + 2)nd



















Then proceed analogously to the 1st iteration step.
The above procedure determines at the kth iteration step a unique number ik such
that the ￿rst ik + 1 probability weights for entries in sk coincide with the ￿rst ik + 1
probability weights for entries in tk. Moreover, by the notational convention distribution









By the above procedure, any two compound lotteries s;t are transformed after a ￿nite
number of iteration steps, say M, into notationally equivalent compound lotteries sM;tM.
Moreover, since each iteration step generates the same number of entries with identical
probability weights for all entry pairs, sM and tM must share the same number of entries.

















































￿k such that s
0










￿k such that t
0
j+1 ￿ x ￿ t
0
j.
Our claim is trivially proved if, for all j 2 f1;:::;ng, sj ￿ tj. Thus, assume that (5) is
satis￿ed and denote by s0
j;t0























Repeating this argument for the remaining r 2 Lm shows that (4) is satis￿ed as well.
Assume now that (4) is satis￿ed and denote by r￿ 2 Lm the compound lottery such
























j for all j 2 f1;:::;ng such that r￿ ￿ s0
j and r￿ ￿ t0






























￿A contradiction to (4). Repeating this argument ￿nally proves our claim.￿
Proof of the Proposition. Restricted to compound lotteries s;t 2 Lm+1 with two
entries only, ME (=monotonicity with respect to ￿E) with support on Lm obviously
coincides with the de￿nition of independence with support on Lm. As a consequence,
we obtain that, for arbitrary m 2 N, ME with support on Lm implies independence with
support on Lm. In view of the lemma we can therefore prove the proposition by showing
that, for arbitrary m 2 N, independence with support on Lm+1 implies ME with support
on Lm.
We prove this claim by induction over the number of entries in the compound lotteries
in Lm. At ￿rst we show that ME with support on Lm is satis￿ed for all compound
lotteries s;t 2 Lm+1 having exactly one entry in their support.







such that s0 ￿ t0 whereas t ￿ s. By reduction of compound lotteries, s ￿ s0 and t ￿ t0,
implying, by transitivity, s ￿ t ￿ s. A contradiction to the ordering assumption.
Assume now that ME with support on Lm is satis￿ed for all compound lotteries
s;t 2 Lm+1 with k entries. We prove: if independence with support on Lm+1 is satis￿ed,
then ME with support on Lm must be satis￿ed for all compound lotteries s;t 2 Lm+1
with k + 1 entries.
Suppose on the contrary that ME with support on Lm is violated for some compound





















such that sj ￿ tj for all j 2 f1;:::;k + 1g whereas t ￿ s. By reduction of compound






































































!since sj ￿ tj for all j 2 f1;:::;kg. Because of sk+1 ￿ tk+1, independence with sup-
port on Lm+1 implies s0 ￿ t0. By transitivity, s ￿ t ￿ s, contradicting the ordering
assumption.￿￿References
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